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Plain Error but No Plain Future: North Carolina's Plain Error
Review After State v. Lawrence*
INTRODUCTION

There's nothing plain about plain error. In February 2013, the
United States Supreme Court handed down its most recent opinion
on the federal plain error standard. The Court held that, when a
criminal defendant fails to object at trial to what was not yet error but
became error by the time the defendant's case reached the court of
appeals, the case can still be reversed and remanded because of plain
error.' The result may be fair but an eerie question lingers: How can
there be plain error reversal if no one actually made a plain error?
Such bizarre questions are not uncommon in plain error
jurisprudence. At one point, the federal standard had fallen into such
disrepute that one scholar labeled it a "Gorilla rule," a standard so
unfixed that it may have been a "roving commission for appellate
judges to seek out and correct error wherever it can be found."' Such
questions may be like reading Franz Kafka's The Castle,3 a project
unfinished and perhaps unfinishable, but this Recent Development
proceeds with the assumption that they are worth asking.
Thankfully, some concepts surrounding the standard are plainer
than others. Plain error review is a product of the judiciary's duty to
ensure justice. The adversarial model is useful to courts for ensuring
just results because the opposing litigants are normally presumed to
highlight the flaws in their opponents' arguments through timely
objections.' Normally, when there is no objection, any error is waived
on appeal.' But where the life and liberty of a criminal defendant are
* @ 2013 Troy D. Shelton.
1. See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124-25 (2013).
2. Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and
the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023,1052 (1987).
3. FRANZ KAFKA, THE CASTLE (Ritchie Robertson, ed., Anthea Bell trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 2009) (1926). Although first published in 1926, Kafka died two years before,
without finishing the book. Id. at xxvii.
4. See State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 512, 723 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2012) (recognizing
that the adversarial model allows the justice system to achieve its central objective of
determining the defendant's guilt or innocence without placing an undue burden on the
trial judge).
5. Id. (noting "[i]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify
reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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on the line, justice sometimes requires the court to step in and
"protect the defendant."' The justification for the judiciary's leniency
is an interest not only in justice but also in the appearance of justice.'
Courts that conduct plain error review have relaxed the rules of
appellate procedure, taking into consideration both individual
outcomes and the general integrity of the judicial system. 8
There is a consensus on the general need for the leniency of plain
error review, but courts have struggled to fashion a rule that can be
consistently applied. The need to "alleviate the potential harshness of
preservation rules"' seems compelling when life and liberty are at
stake. Despite the need, "a clear, conceptual definition of the rule has
remained somewhat elusive."'o Attempts to clarify the plain error
standard have given the "distinct impression that 'plain error' is a
concept appellate courts have found impossible to define, save that
they know it when they see it."n
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's recent opinion in State v.
Lawrencel2 attempted to clarify the nature and application of plain
error review. Explaining that the court's role is "to provide guidance
and clarification when the law is unclear or applied inconsistently,"
the court undertook to "promote more uniform application of the
law" by clarifying the application of plain error review in North
Carolina's appellate courts. 3
Lawrence was the first major revision of the plain error standard
since North Carolina adopted it in 1983.14 This Recent Development
gauges the success of State v. Lawrence in clarifying the plain error
standard. The analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I identifies the
need for clarification in the plain error standard that existed before
Lawrence, and Part II explains the decision in Lawrence. Part III
identifies the elements of the plain error review that Lawrence
6. 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 856, at 547 (4th ed. 2013).
7. Id. at 548 ("It is important that justice be done but it is also important that justice
seem to be done.").
8. Id. at 545-49.
9. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 514, 723 S.E.2d at 332 (citing State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655,
660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)).
10. Id. at 507 n.2, 723 S.E.2d at 327 n.2.
11. WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 6, at 546-47.

12. 365 N.C. 506, 723 S.E.2d 326 (2012).
13. Id. at 511-12, 723 S.E.2d at 330.
14. Id. at 511, 723 S.E.2d at 330 ("We are mindful that this Court has not issued a
doctrinal statement regarding the plain error standard of review in almost thirty years.").
North Carolina first adopted the plain error rule in State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300
S.E.2d 375 (1983). See infra Part I.
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changed and the elements that Lawrence left untouched. Part IV
evaluates the success and shortcomings of the decision, and Part V
concludes with some final thoughts on the future of plain error review
in North Carolina. This Recent Development argues that, overall,
Lawrence was needed and has updated North Carolina's plain error
standard to approximate the federal standard. At the same time, it
has fallen short of its stated goal of clarification by leaving the
requirements for proving plain error muddled. Yet, in a surprising
move, the court's opinion in Lawrence laid the groundwork for
expanding plain error review, making it the default type of review for
unpreserved errors in criminal trials.
I. THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION

Eighty-seven years after the United States Supreme Court first
instituted plain error review," and forty-seven years after the Court's
first major clarification of plain error review in United States v.
Atkinson,16 the Supreme Court of North Carolina introduced plain
error review into the state's jurisprudence in State v. Odom." As
discussed below, Odom has shown some resiliency, but time has also
taken its toll. In particular, at least three factors affected the vitality
of Odom: (1) the federal standard purportedly adopted by Odom was
itself unclear; (2) the United States Supreme Court changed the
federal standard for plain error review upon which Odom had
relied;'" and (3) the North Carolina Court of Appeals began to depart
from the Odom standard when reviewing for plain error."
The Odom court claimed to adopt the plain error rule as it was
then applied by the Fourth Circuit. The Odom court found the plain
error standard

from

United States v.

McCaskilFo particularly

instructive:
[T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and

only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire
record, it can be said the claimed error is a "fundamental error,
15. See Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 659 (1896) ("[W]e may properly take
notice of what we believe to be a plain error, although it was not duly excepted to.").
16. 297 U.S. 157 (1936). Atkinson contained the federal judiciary's first explanation of
the nature of plain error review. The Court held that the federal appellate courts could
take notice of unpreserved errors in criminal cases when the errors were "obvious" or
"otherwise seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." Id. at 160.
17. 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983).
18. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
20. 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1982).
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something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that
justice cannot have been done," or "where [the error] is grave
error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the
accused," or the error has " 'resulted in a miscarriage of justice
or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial' " or where the error
is such as to "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings" or where it can be fairly said
"the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury's
finding that the defendant was guilty." 21
The Odom court implied that it was adopting McCaskill's plain
error rule in full, 22 but perhaps perceiving that one rule, rather than
five, would better guide the court of appeals, the Odom court selected
as the thrust of plain error review whether an unpreserved error had a
"probable impact on the jury's finding of guilt." 23 Although the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Odom did not cite to Atkinson,
it noted that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure that had
codified federal plain error review was virtually identical to the North
Carolina rule.24
After the Supreme Court of North Carolina articulated the
Odom test, the United States Supreme Court changed the federal
standard, attempting to give plain error review a straighter spine than
the rule given in a case like McCaskill.25 In United States v. Olano,2
the Court used a mostly three-prong analysis, putting the burden on
defendants to prove there was "error," that it was "plain" or "clear,"
21. Odom, 307 N.C. at 660,300 S.E.2d at 378 (second, third, fourth, and fifth emphasis
added) (quoting McCaskill, 676 F.2d at 1002).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 379 (citing United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003 (7th
Cir. 1978)). It seems likely that the Odom court relied upon McCaskill rather than
Atkinson to avoid any suggestion that plain error review had an application in a civil
context. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that North Carolina limits
plain error review to criminal cases, unlike the federal judiciary). Compare United States
v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 158 (1936) (involving a government contracts dispute), with
McCaskill, 676 F.2d at 996 (reviewing a bank robbery conviction). In applying this rule,
the Odom court concluded that the error did not amount to plain error because the State's
"corroborated" evidence was relatively stronger than the defendant's "uncorroborated"
testimony. Odom, 307 N.C. at 661-62, 300 S.E.2d at 379. Thus, the defendant would have
been convicted absent the error. Id.
24. See Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378. At that time, the federal plain error
rule was codified in Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id.
25. As demonstrated by the quote of the federal rule from McCaskill, see supra text
accompanying note 21, Atkinson itself had undergone significant change in the hands of
the federal courts of appeals. It is the Atkinson standard that Lawrence adds to North
Carolina's plain error rule. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
26. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
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and that it "affect[ed] substantial rights."2 7 The Court also stated that
the power of plain error review was "permissive, not mandatory,"2
such that a reviewing court "should not exercise [its] discretion unless
the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.' "29 Four years later, in Johnson v. United
States, 0 the Court again explained the rule and made clear that the
reviewing court cannot reverse an unpreserved error unless the
defendant proves four elements: "(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3)
that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited
error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.""
In the thirty years since Odom, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals has drifted from the rule set out in Odom, sometimes
combining it with standards of review used for preserved errors.32 For
example, in State v. Blizzard," the court of appeals noted that it was
reviewing only for plain error because the alleged error in the jury
instructions was unpreserved from the trial court.' Yet, the court of
appeals then cited, as the standard of review, that the defendant
needed to show not only that an error occurred in the jury
instructions, but that "such error was likely, in light of the entire
charge, to mislead the jury."" While this rule was similar to the rule
set out in Odom, its genesis is actually in "harmless error,"" which
applies only to preserved errors."
By 2012, Odom was showing its age. With the federal standard
taking an entirely different shape, and given the court of appeals'
reliance on its own standards for plain error review rather than the

27. Id. at 732, 734.
28. Id. at 735.
29. Id. at 732 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
30. 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
31. Id. at 466-67 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
32. See, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) ("[T]he
Court of Appeals applied an incorrect formulation of the plain error standard of review.").
33. 169 N.C. App. 285, 610 S.E.2d 245 (2005).
34. Id. at 296, 610 S.E.2d at 253.
35. Id. at 296-97, 610 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting Bass v. Johnson, 149 N.C. App. 152, 160,
560 S.E.2d 841, 847 (2002)).
36. Caldwell v. S. Ry. Co., 218 N.C. 63, 72, 10 S.E.2d 680, 685 (1940). Caldwell was
decided over four decades before the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted plain error
review in its 1983 Odom decision.
37. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 512-13, 723 S.E.2d at 330-31.
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standard in Odom, the need for clarification in North Carolina's plain
error jurisprudence was "plain."
II. STATE V. LAWRENCE

In 2012, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided to use
State v. Lawrence as a vehicle to clarify the foundation and
application of the plain error standard. The defendant David
Lawrence was convicted on two counts each of attempted robbery
with a dangerous weapon, attempted kidnapping, attempted breaking
and entering, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon." The defendant was approached by a group of out-of-state
residents who planned to rob a suspected drug dealer by attacking his
girlfriend.39 The group planned to rob the dealer's girlfriend as she
took her child to school in the morning by throwing gasoline on her
and then threatening both to shoot her and set her on fire.40 As the
members of the group took their places in the morning, watchful
neighbors reported their furtive behavior to the police. 4' The early
arrival of a police car surprised the group, though they disbanded
before they could be apprehended.4 2
Undeterred, the group returned the next evening.43 The
defendant planned to ambush the girlfriend as she returned home and
walked to her door." Fortunately for the girlfriend, a neighbor
spotted the defendant, called the police, and confronted the
defendant with a pistol; the defendant fled.45 The group tried to
disband but was arrested by the police that night, except for the
defendant, who was arrested four months later in Mississippi.4 6
At trial, when the court instructed the jury on conspiracy to
commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, the judge "erroneously
omitted the element that the weapon must have been used to
endanger or threaten the life of the victim."47 The trial court repeated

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 510, 723 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 508, 723 S.E.2d at 328.
Id. at 508-09, 723 S.E.2d at 328.
Id. at 509, 723 S.E.2d at 328.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 509, 723 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 510, 723 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. The State conceded the error on appeal. Id.
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the erroneous instruction when the jury asked for clarification. 48 Trial
counsel made no timely objection to any of these jury instructions.49
On appeal, a unanimous'panel of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial, holding that the erroneous jury instruction amounted to plain
error.so The court explained that the plain error standard requires the
defendant to show "that the jury was misled or that the verdict was
affected by [the] instruction" and that "such error was likely, in light
of the entire charge, to mislead the jury.""1 The court found that the
jury's request for clarification was "persuasive evidence that the trial
court's instruction mislead [sic] the jury in regards to the State's
burden of proof."5 2
The Supreme Court of North Carolina then granted
discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals
applied the correct plain error standard and whether the alleged error
was plain error.53 After discarding the standard applied by the court
of appeals,54 the supreme court laid out the plain error standard. The
court noted that "[flor error to constitute plain error, a defendant
must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial." 5 To
prove fundamental error, "a defendant must establish prejudicethat, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable
impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty."56
Additionally, "because plain error is to be 'applied cautiously and
only in the exceptional case,' the error will often be one that
'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.' "I
Applying this new rule, the court reviewed the evidence from
trial. The court unanimously held that the error did not rise to the
level of plain error because the evidence against the defendant was so
"overwhelming and uncontroverted" that it could not be shown that,
"absent the error, the jury probably would have returned a different
48. Id. at 511, 723 S.E.2d at 329.
49. Id.
50. See id.; State v. Lawrence, 210 N.C. App. 73, 91-92, 706 S.E.2d 822, 836 (2011),
rev'd, 365 N.C. 506, 723 S.E.2d 326 (2012).
51. Lawrence, 210 N.C. App. at 89, 706 S.E.2d at 834 (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C. App. 285, 296-97, 610 S.E.2d 245, 253 (2005)).
52. Id. at 91, 706 S.E.2d at 836.
53. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 506-07, 723 S.E.2d at 327.
54. Id. at 507-08, 723 S.E.2d at 327-28.
55. Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334.
56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d
375, 378 (1983)).
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verdict. Thus, he cannot show the prejudicial effect necessary to
establish that the error was a fundamental error."" The court also
observed that "the error in no way seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
III. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Responding to the need for clarification of the plain error
review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina's opinion in Lawrence
retained elements of the existing plain error review from Odom, but it
also set out important changes. For instance, the Lawrence court
continued to focus on the probable impact of the error on the jury's
verdict. Yet, the language from Lawrence departed from Odom in
several important respects. The following subsections explore the
elements of Odom that remain intact after Lawrence and the possible
areas of change effected or foreshadowed by Lawrence.
A.

Continuity

Although Lawrence signaled changes in both the reach of plain
error review and its basic formulation, it kept much of the plain error
doctrine enunciated by Odom and its progeny. Many of the
prerequisites to receive plain error review are the same. First,
defendants must still prove that an actual error occurred. 60 Second,
unlike the federal standard, North Carolina courts review for plain
error in criminal cases only.61 Third, and again unlike the federal
standard, which appears to apply to any type of error,62 the North
Carolina standard "is normally limited to instructional and

58. Id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 335.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 515, 723 S.E.2d at 332 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33
(1993)).
61. Compare id. at 507 n.1, 723 S.E.2d. at 327 n.1 ("In North Carolina, plain error
review has no application to appeals in civil cases."), with FED. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2) ("A
court may consider a plain error in the instructions that has not been preserved as
required by Rule 51(d)(1) if the error affects substantial rights."). The approach taken by
North Carolina courts has been noted with approval by commentators because the due
process concerns in criminal matters are substantially weightier than in civil matters. See
Martineau, supra note 2, at 1055-56.
62. See WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 6, at 574-75 ("There would seem to be no
error to which plain error review would not apply, however, some have suggested that
errors in sentencing, unraised below, should be reviewed with a less deferential standard
as the costs of resentencing are lower than the costs of retrial. No exception for sentencing
errors appears in either the [plain error rule] or the Court's cases interpreting the rule."
(footnote omitted)).
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evidentiary error." 63 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has
specifically refused to extend the rule to unpreserved statements
made during jury voir dire,' and the North Carolina Court of
Appeals has refused to review some types of sentencing errors for
plain error."s Finally, on appeal, criminal defendants must
"specifically and distinctly contend[]" that the errors "amount to
plain error."66
More importantly, the focus of plain error review still seems to
be whether the error had a probable impact on the jury's verdict.
Once the defendant meets the prerequisites, he still bears the burden
of demonstrating that the error at trial amounted to plain error.67 As
in federal court,' North Carolina's plain error standard focuses
primarily on whether the error was prejudicial to the defendant,
which is the same as demonstrating that the error "had a probable
impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty."69 Thus, in
North Carolina's plain error jurisprudence, "prejudice" and
"probable impact" are synonymous.
63. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 516, 723 S.E.2d at 333 (citing State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592,
615, 565 S.E.2d 22, 39-40 (2002)); see also Tory A. Weigand, Raise or Lose: Appellate
Discretion and PrincipledDecision-Making, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 179,

222 & n.223 (2012) (citing State v. Lawrence and explaining that North Carolina is one of
about eight states that narrows plain error review to certain types of errors); infra text
accompanying notes 115-21. It is worth noting that the language in Lawrence suggests the
possibility of plain error review in other contexts, even though the case cited for this
prerequisite, State v. Wiley, was significantly more categorical. See State v. Wiley, 355 N.C.
592, 615, 565 S.E.2d 22, 39-40 (2002) ("Additionally, this Court has held that plain error
analysis applies only to jury instructions and evidentiary matters . ... ").
64. See Wiley, 355 N.C. at 615-16, 565 S.E.2d at 39-40 ("[T]his Court

...

has

specifically declined to extend application of the plain error doctrine to situations where a
party failed to object to statements made by the other party during jury voir dire.").
65. See, e.g., State v. Oakes, No. COA11-979, 2012 WL 121212, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App.
Jan. 17, 2012) (declining plain error review of alleged inappropriate comments by the trial
judge during sentencing); State v. Holder, No. COA05-414, 2006 WL 539369, at *1 (N.C.
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2006) (declining plain error review of a re-sentencing hearing). But see
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446(d)(18) (2011) (automatically preserving for review many
different types of errors, including sentencing errors where "[tihe sentence imposed was
unauthorized at the time imposed, exceeded the maximum authorized by law, was illegally
imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law").
66. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(a)(4); see also Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 516, 723 S.E.2d at 333. It
is also worth noting that defendants gain no advantage by claiming there were multiple
errors such that the effect of the error was compounded, creating plain error. See State v.
Moore, 366 N.C. 100, 108, 726 S.E.2d 168, 174 (2012) ("Defendant also argues that the
trial court's other alleged errors 'compounded the plain error here.' We disagree that
errors can be 'compounded' under plain error review.").
67. See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 516, 723 S.E.2d at 333.
68. See WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 6, at 561 ("In most claims of plain error, the
outcome turns on whether or not prejudice can be demonstrated.").
69. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Lawrence explains how to apply this standard, noting that
prejudice is determined "after examination of the entire record."7 In
application, courts consider the totality of evidence against a
defendant, as well as evidence offered by the defendant. If the
reviewing court determines that the jury's verdict would have been
the same regardless of the error, then the court may characterize the
defendant
as
"overwhelming."7 2
evidence
against
the
"Overwhelming" evidence appears to preclude any "probable
impact.",7
When the trial court makes an instructional error such as failing
to mention a required element of the crime, the reviewing court takes
an elemental approach to determine whether there is
"overwhelming" evidence of the erroneously omitted element. In
Lawrence, the court considered such an error. When charging the jury
on the elements of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon, the trial court erred when it "omitted the element that the
weapon must have been used to endanger or threaten the life of the
victim." 74 To determine whether this error had a probable impact on
the jury's verdict, the court reviewed the record to see what evidence
supported this element. The court noted that the jury had been
correctly instructed on the elements of attempted robbery with a
dangerous weapon and therefore assumed that every element from
that offense was met." The court then appeared to assume that none
of the elements of the erroneous charge-conspiracy to commit
robbery with a dangerous weapon-were met." But after comparing
the elements of these two crimes, the court concluded that the
erroneous charge only contained one additional element: that
defendant "entered into an agreement" to commit robbery with a
dangerous weapon."
The court then cataloged the evidence in the record that would
support this missing element. It noted testimony by "multiple
witnesses," including co-conspirators, describing the group's efforts to
"kidnap, threaten, and rob" the victim. 78 Those co-conspirators also

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
See id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 334-35.
See id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 334.
See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 510, 723 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 334.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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testified that the defendant "knew what was going on."79 The
evidence showed that the defendant also knew each part of the plan.so
Therefore, the court concluded, "[i]n light of the overwhelming and
uncontroverted evidence, defendant cannot show that, absent the
error, the jury probably would have returned a different verdict." 8'
This approach models the form set by Odom. Odom, finding no
plain error, had not used the word "overwhelming," but had instead
juxtaposed the State's "corroborated" evidence against the
defendant's own "uncorroborated testimony" that was contradicted
by the State's witnesses and the defendant's impeachment.82 Just a
few years after Odom, the Supreme Court of North Carolina began
finding that "overwhelming evidence against [a] defendant" can
"prevent[] the error complained of from rising to the level of 'plain
error' within the meaning of ... State v. Odom."8 3
This approach is also not unique to North Carolina. The United
States Supreme Court has found that errors do not rise to the level of
plain error when the evidence of an element missing due to an
erroneous jury instruction is still "overwhelming." For example, in
Johnson v. United States, the district court erred in not submitting the
issue of materiality, an element of perjury, to the jury.' However, the
error did not rise to the level of plain error because "the evidence
supporting materiality was 'overwhelming' ... [and] was essentially

uncontroverted at trial and has remained so on appeal."" Differing
from the North Carolina cases, however, the United States Supreme
Court made this holding under the fourth prong of its analysis, finding
that the "overwhelming" evidence barred any conclusion that the
instructional error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings."" The Lawrence court
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 334-35.
81. Id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 335.
82. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 661, 300 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1983).
83. State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 40, 340 S.E.2d 80, 84 (1986) (citing State v. Black,
308 N.C. 736, 303 S.E.2d 804 (1983); Odom, 307 N.C. at 655, 300 S.E.2d at 375); see also
State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 328, 338 S.E.2d 75, 86 (1986) ("In this case, our review of
the entire record convinces us that this error does not constitute 'plain error' entitling the
defendant to a new trial. The State presented overwhelming evidence of the defendant's
guilt.").
84. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 463, 467 (1997).
85. Id. at 470 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 469-70 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court went on to conclude that it would be the reversal, in
the face of overwhelming evidence, that would seriously affect the "fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id.
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noted this difference in approach.87 So it appears that in North
Carolina, "overwhelming evidence" weakens defendants' arguments
more on the probable impact prong than on the judicial integrity
prong.
Overall, Lawrence stands as a rightful heir to Odom; the
Supreme Court of North Carolina sought jurisprudential refinement,
not revolution. However, the changes suggested by Lawrence are not
insignificant.
B.

Change

Lawrence instituted two main changes in the plain error doctrine.
The first and most obvious difference is the addition of another
"prong" in the plain error analysis. Although North Carolina's plain
error review focuses on the error's probable impact on the jury
verdict, the Lawrence court also noted that "because plain error is to
be 'applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case,' the error will
often be one that 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.' "88 Unfortunately, the court's
addition of "often" makes it unclear whether the harm to judicial
proceedings is a separate requirement that calls for independent
analysis or whether it is a general statement of the purpose of the
plain error review. This ambiguity and its consequences are examined
further below.89
The second change added more justification and context for the
plain error rule. Odom noted the "potential harshness" of appellate
forfeiture rules.90 Lawrence explained that the central purpose of a
criminal trial is to "decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence."" To effect this, the American legal system relies on
the "adversarial model."9 2 This model requires timely objections by
the parties to help the judge, "a neutral decisionmaker," ensure
justice.93 To encourage timely objections, the legal system treats
preserved and unpreserved errors differently, giving the advantage on
appeal to the defendant who notifies the trial court of a potential
87. See State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) ("The
standard recognized in Atkinson is unlikely to be satisfied, however, when evidence of the
defendant's guilt is overwhelming.").
88. Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378).
89. See infra Part IV.B.
90. Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
91. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 512, 723 S.E.2d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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error. 4 By reaffirming Odom," the court also seemed to adopt that
case's raison d'etre for the plain error rule, an aversion to harsh
forfeiture rules96 that could interfere with "the factual question of the
defendant's guilt or innocence." 97
IV. EVALUATING LAWRENCE

Lawrence aimed to clarify the plain error doctrine. In many
respects, Lawrence was a success, in part by building on the probable
impact prong and diving deeper into the rationale for plain error
review. However, the addition of the second prong has created new
issues that the court will need to address.
A.

Where Lawrence Succeeds

Lawrence's first success is in continuing the "overwhelming
evidence" framework within the probable impact analysis.98 This
continuity is important because the framework appears to proceed
from the central purpose of the criminal trial, resolving "the factual
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."9 9 If a reviewing court
ignores the error and still finds that evidence against a defendant is
"overwhelming," then the justification for plain error review does not
exist. Without a probable impact on the jury's verdict, the harsh
preservation rules of appellate procedure have harmed nothing."o
A post-Lawrence disagreement at the Supreme Court of North
Carolina over the plain error standard has reinforced this framework.
In State v. Towe,or the court found error in the trial court's admission
of an expert's conclusory testimony that a juvenile victim had been
sexually abused.102 Noting that the "case turned on the credibility of
the victim, who provided the only direct evidence against
defendant,""o' the majority examined the expert's testimony and
found "that [the expert's] testimony [had] stilled any doubts the jury
might have had about the victim's credibility or defendant's
culpability, and thus had a probable impact on the jury's finding that

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
See id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334.
See State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983).
Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 512, 723 S.E.2d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See supraPart III.A.
Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 512, 723 S.E.2d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
366 N.C. 56, 732 S.E.2d 564 (2012).
Id. at 56-57, 732 S.E.2d at 564-65.
Id. at 63, 732 S.E.2d at 568.
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defendant is guilty."" However, the dissent argued that the majority
was undermining Lawrence because the expert's "statement was
clarified and its impact mitigated on cross-examination.""os Moreover,
reviewing this one statement of the expert in light of the entire
record, the dissent determined that "the State [had] presented
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt."" In this case, only one
member of the court disagreed with this particular application of the
framework, and more importantly, the entire court agreed on the
general nature of the analysis.
Moreover, it appears that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has effectively caught the attention of the court of appeals on this
point, causing the intermediate court to adopt this framework. For
example, the supreme court remanded State v. Boyd' 7 for the sole
purpose of applying the Lawrence standard.' The case involved a
jury instruction for second-degree kidnapping that erred by
permitting a removal theory not supported by the evidence or bill of
indictment.'09 The majority could not "discern from the record
whether all twelve jurors convicted Defendant on [the correctly]
instructed theories," and because there was "zero evidence (much less
'overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence') that Defendant
'removed' the victim," the error amounted to plain error.o Yet the
dissent thought that the "evidence against defendant was
'overwhelming' and much was uncontroverted,"I'' such that the
omission of several words from the jury instruction would "make no
difference at all in the result."'12 Other post-Lawrence cases at the
court of appeals have likewise focused on the distinction between
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 64, 732 S.E.2d at 569.
Id. at 67, 732 S.E.2d at 571 (Newby, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added).
366 N.C. 210, 739 S.E.2d 838 (2012).

108. See State v. Boyd, _ N.C. App. _,
, 730 S.E.2d 193, 193-94, cert. and
discretionaryreview denied, _ N.C. _, 734 S.E.2d 859 (2012), and rev'd, _ N.C. -, 742

S.E.2d 798 (2013) (per curiam) (reversing course, deciding the case, and adopting the
dissenting opinion from Boyd, - N.C. App. at _, 730 S.E.2d. at 198 (Stroud, J.,
dissenting)).
109. Id. at -, 730 S.E.2d at 197-98 (majority opinion). The trial court instructed the
jury that it could find the defendant guilty of second-degree kidnapping if it found that the
defendant removed the victim from one place to another without his consent. See id. at 730 S.E.2d at 195-96. However, this removal theory of kidnapping was not supported by
the evidence in the case or entered into the bill of indictment. See id at _, 730 S.E.2d at
196-97.
110. Id. at_, 730 S.E.2d at 197-98.
111. Id. at _, 730 S.E.2d at 199 (Stroud, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Lawrence, 365
N.C. 506, 519, 723 S.E.2d 326, 335 (2012)).
112. Id. at , 730 S.E.2d at 201.
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overwhelming evidence and probable impact."' Again, although
there is occasional disagreement in the result, the method of analysis
is certain.
Along with helping lower courts distinguish between
overwhelming evidence and probable impact, Lawrence explores the
foundation of plain error review more richly. This discussion gives
courts going forward the needed jurisprudential foundation to
determine whether to expand or maintain the scope of plain error
review. Lawrence clarified plain error in part by contrasting it with
other types of error. Though prejudice is an element of both harmless
error and plain error, the Lawrence court distinguished the other
defining characteristics of the two concepts in North Carolina
jurisprudence." 4 As noted above,"' Lawrence also clarified the
justifications for the plain error rule.
With these pieces in place, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
is in a better position to consider expanding plain error review, or at
least justify a refusal to extend it by referring to the purpose of the
doctrine. For example, the Lawrence court noted that "plain error
review in North Carolina is normally limited to instructional and
evidentiary error."n' Curiously, it cited State v. Wiley"' for this
proposition, even though Wiley's rule was much more categorical:
"[T]his Court has held that plain error analysis applies only to jury
instructions and evidentiary matters.""' Thus, Lawrence seems to
suggest that the court would at least consider expanding the doctrine.
113. See, e.g., State v. Vasquez, No. COA12-346, 2012 WL 4879576, at *5 (N.C. Ct.
App. Oct. 16, 2012) ("As stated in the facts above, and in light of the overwhelming
evidence presented at trial that supported Defendants' convictions for assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, we hold that, even if the jury had been instructed
on any lesser included offenses, Defendants have failed to prove that the jury probably
would have reached a different verdict[.]" (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); State v. Guy, No. COA12-197, 2012 WL 2896388, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App.
July 17, 2012) ("Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt propounded at trial
by the State, we perceive no likelihood that the result of the trial based on the instructions
would have been any different had the trial court read a different charge."); State v.
Crank, No. COA12-101, 2012 WL 2552279, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. July 3, 2012) ("However,
we need not decide whether Defendant or the State has the better of this dispute given
that a thorough review of the record demonstrates that the evidence of Defendant's guilt
was overwhelming, so that Defendant would not be entitled to relief even if the trial court
erred by allowing the admission of the challenged evidence.").
114. See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 512-14, 723 S.E.2d at 330-32 (distinguishing structural
error, or error per se, from plain error).
115. See supra Part III.B.
116. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 516, 723 S.E.2d at 333 (emphasis added) (citing State v.
Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 615, 565 S.E.2d 22, 39-40 (2002)).
117. 355 N.C. 592, 565 S.E.2d 22 (2002).
118. Id. at 615, 565 S.E.2d at 39-40 (emphasis added).
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An expansion would be a move toward the majority rule that plain
error review is the default method of review for unpreserved errors in
criminal proceedings.119
If Lawrence remains honest to the ultimate purpose of criminal
proceedings, to resolve the "factual question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence,"120 there seems to be no reason not to extend the plain
error rule into some new territory, including inappropriate comments
made by prosecutors during opening statements and closing
arguments. In these situations, unpreserved error could affect the
jury's ability to determine the defendant's guilt because of
inappropriate arguments. In such cases, plain error would merely be
the default standard of review for unpreserved errors. However, in
some pre-trial proceedings, like jury voir dire,'21 or after trial, like
sentencing,12 2 guilt or innocence is not the question to be asked, and
so the justification of Lawrence would not suffice. Thus, it is with
some irony that, although Lawrence provided a more complete theory
of plain error, it suggests that the current set of applications is
incomplete. Greater clarity in the foundations of the doctrine works
to unsettle and expand the application of the doctrine.
B.

Where Lawrence Falls Short

Because Lawrence added a second, judicial harm "prong" into
the plain error calculation, it is not clear what future fact
permutations may hold. This new prong now says that plain error
119. See generally Weigand, supra note 63, at 222 (noting that North Carolina is one of
"only about eight . . . states refusing to adopt [a plain error rule] or otherwise limiting any
plain error review to death penalty cases or erroneous jury instruction claims").
120. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 512, 723 S.E.2d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 347, 611 S.E.2d 794, 811 (2005) (refusing to
extend plain error review to jury voir dire); State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 613, 536
S.E.2d 36, 47 (2000) (same).
122. There seems to be some tension between the supreme court and the court of
appeals on the application of plain error review to sentencing. The supreme court has
explicitly refused to review sentencing proceedings for plain error. See, e.g., State v.
Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 460, 533 S.E.2d 168, 230-31 (2000) ("[W]e note [defendant]
concedes he did not object to joinder for sentencing or renew a previous motion to
sever.... [Defendant] argues, however, the trial court's error amounts to plain error
pursuant to [N.C. R. APP. P.] 10(c)(4). However, plain error review is limited to errors in a
trial court's jury instructions or a trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence. This
Court has previously declined to extend plain error review to other issues, and we decline
to do so now." (citation omitted)). But the court of appeals, even after Golphin, has
explicitly reviewed sentencing proceedings for plain error. See, e.g., State v. Valentine, No.
COA01-523, 2002 WL 857556, at *2-3 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2002) (reviewing sentencing
proceedings for plain error). But see State v. Pouncy, No. COAO3-407, 2004 WL 743779, at
*2 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2004) (refusing to review sentencing proceedings for plain
error).
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"often" harms judicial proceedings, departing from the federal
standard. That Lawrence declined to explain the second prong
compounds the ambiguity.
1. How Often is "Often"?
Whereas the federal courts always require an error that seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings, the Lawrence court concluded that plain error would
"often," but not necessarily, involve such harm. 123 Lawrence left it
unclear what could meet this prong-and whether it is even a prong
at all.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has not clarified how the
judicial harm inquiry differs from the probable impact prong. The
Lawrence court conducted no legal analysis under this prong, but
merely concluded that it was not met: "In addition, the error in no
way seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings."' 24 The words "[i]n addition" do suggest,
however, that the conclusion is at least somewhat independent of the
probable impact analysis. A few months after the Lawrence decision,
in State v. Towe, the court concluded that "the erroneous admission
of expert testimony that impermissibly bolstered the victim's
credibility" had a probable impact on the jury's verdict.125 The
victim's testimony, which was bolstered by the expert's erroneouslyadmitted testimony, was "the only direct evidence against
defendant."1 26 "As a result," the court determined, it was "also
persuaded that this error is one that 'seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, [and] public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "127 The
Towe analysis appears to combine the two prongs because the court
made its conclusion on the judicial harm prong "[a]s a result" of its
probable impact analysis. The dissent focused entirely on the lack of
probable impact, with no mention of harm to judicial proceedings.128

123. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334. This ambiguity may have been a
necessary result of having a unanimous doctrinal statement. Though just enough votes
may have been there for a clearer standard-perhaps the federal standard, requiring both
probable impact and harm to judicial proceedings-the court may have desired a greater
consensus on such a major doctrinal issue. Regardless of the court's internal machinations,
clarity would require the court to explain what constitutes harm to judicial proceedings.
124. Id. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 335.
125. State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 62-63, 732 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2012).
126. Id. at 63, 732 S.E.2d at 568.
127. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 335).
128. See id. at 67, 732 S.E.2d at 571 (Newby, J., dissenting).
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A review of the Supreme Court of North Carolina's plain error
cases from Odom to Lawrence shows that the focus has always been
on probable impact.129 There does not appear to be any case
conducting an independent analysis of whether an error seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. And yet Lawrence suggests without elaboration that the
two elements need not concur.130
Federal cases decided before Lawrence could help distinguish
between the prongs. In Puckett v. United States,'"' the United States

Supreme Court attempted to explain the difference. While explaining
the four-prong analysis from United States v. Olano, the Court noted
that the third prong, requiring that the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights, ordinarily means that the defendant must
demonstrate that the error " 'affected the outcome of the district
court proceedings.' "132 The Court noted that the fourth, judicial harm
prong "is meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive
basis," and as such, a "per se approach" is "flawed."' 33 Where the
error affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings,
"countervailing factors in particular cases" may prevent the error
from being reversed on appeal.134
The Court found just such a circumstance with the defendant in
Puckett. The district court had, in violation of defendant's rights,3 '
allowed the government to renege on a plea bargain that required the
defendant to plead guilty to two crimes in exchange for the
government agreeing that the defendant had accepted responsibility
for his crimes and requesting the lowest end of the sentencing

129. Shortly after Odom announced the plain error rule, the court issued another
opinion indicating that there could be no plain error where there was no probable impact
on the jury's verdict. See State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 741, 303 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1983)
("We do not believe that there is a reasonable probability that the evidence that defendant
worked in an adult bookstore for approximately ten days 'tilted the scales' in favor of his
conviction by the jury."). Shortly before Lawrence clarified the plain error rule, the court
issued an opinion also indicating that plain error analysis depends upon probable impact.
See State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 130, 711 S.E.2d 122, 142 (2011) ("Moreover, we
conclude that even if the jury had been so instructed, no reasonable probability exists that
the jury would have reached a different verdict or recommended a different sentence."),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1541 (2012).
130. See infra Part IV.B.2.
131. 556 U.S. 129 (2009).
132. Id. at 135 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
133. Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id. at 142-43.
135. Id. at 136. Plain error review in federal court is not limited to instructional and
evidentiary errors. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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guideline level.136 After pleading guilty pursuant to the plea
agreement, but before he was sentenced, the defendant committed
another crime, to which he confessed.
At sentencing, the
government requested that the defendant receive no reduction in
sentence for accepting responsibility, and the district court agreed."'
On review, the Supreme Court appeared to argue that, even if the
other prongs were met in this case, the defendant could not prove the
fourth prong because of "countervailing factors."' 3 9
Thus, the Court traditionally inquires: If the unpreserved error at
trial were left uncorrected on appeal, would that error harm the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings? But
sometimes, to answer this question, the Supreme Court considers the
hypothetical effect of not correcting the error: If the unpreserved
error were reversed on appeal, would that reversal itself harm the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings?
Though similar, the inquiries are not logical equivalents. Rather, the
Court considers the consequences of the alternative disposition to
balance the relative effect on the judicial system. 4 0
The Lawrence court seemed aware of this type of analysis for the
federal standard's fourth prong, but related it back to whether or not
the evidence against a defendant is "overwhelming." In explaining the
federal standard, the Lawrence court noted that
for an appellate court to intervene, a fourth prong must be
satisfied: The error must "seriously affect the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings." While a
miscarriage of justice, most often meaning actual innocence,
would likely satisfy this standard, an error may also satisfy the
standard "independent of the defendant's innocence." The
standard recognized in Atkinson is unlikely to be satisfied,
however, when evidence of the defendant's guilt is

136. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 131.
137. Id. at 131-32.
138. Id. at 132-33.
139. Id. at 143 ("Given that he obviously did not cease his life of crime, receipt of a
sentencing reduction for acceptanceof responsibility would have been so ludicrous as itself
to compromise the public reputation of judicial proceedings.").
140. See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 88 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("On this record, there is no basis for concluding that the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. No miscarriage of justice
will result from deciding not to notice the plain error here.").
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overwhelming.14 1
Although the United States Supreme Court has found
"overwhelming" evidence of guilt to bar a defendant's success on the
fourth, judicial harm prong, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
typically considered overwhelming evidence under the probable
impact analysis. Whether searching for "overwhelming" evidence of
guilt or the potentially harmful effects of reversal, the search for harm
to judicial proceedings appears to proceed on a "case-specific and
fact-intensive"142 basis. This is a confusing result for a court that was
aware of the federal four-prong standard for plain error and yet chose
not to adopt it, and it leaves the value of this prong unexplained.
2. The Lack of Future Guidance
Along with failing to clarify when-if ever-the judicial harm
prong applies, Lawrence also falls short by offering little guidance to
lower courts on how they are to apply plain error review. If probable
impact and harm to the judicial system are separate analyses, then
there are four possible results a reviewing court in North Carolina
could reach once it finds a cognizable, unpreserved error. First, the
court could determine that neither prong is met. Like in Lawrence,
this means that the error does not rise to the level of plain error.143
Second, the reviewing court could find that both prongs are met.
Technically, this only gives the reviewing court permission to find
plain error, but does not mandate a finding of plain error. In both the
North Carolina and federal courts, once the requirements are met,
reversal still lies in the discretion of the reviewing court.'" Despite
this caution, it seems exceedingly unlikely that any court would
conclude both that an error affected the outcome in a particular trial
and harmed the judicial system generally, yet take no action within its

141. State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 732, 736-37 (1993)). Further, the court
in Lawrence cited United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), for the proposition that
" '[t]he real threat then to the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings would be if [the defendant], despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted
evidence [of guilt],' had the conviction overturned on appeal." Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 516,
723 S.E.2d at 333 (alteration in original) (quoting Cotton, 535 U.S. at 634).
142. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142.
143. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 335.
144. Compare id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 ("[P]lain error is to be applied cautiously
and only in the exceptional case." (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Olano, 507
U.S. at 735 ("Rule 52(b) [the federal plain error rule] is permissive, not mandatory.").
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authority to correct the error. This conclusion accords with the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's result in State v. Towe.'45
The more difficult question arises in the third and fourth
scenarios, considered below, when only one prong is met, but not
both. For example, can an unpreserved error have had such a
probable impact on the jury's guilty verdict that, absent the error, the
jury would have reached a different verdict, but not also seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings? And is it possible for the reverse to happen-for an
error to constitute a major harm to the judicial system without also
having a probable impact on the jury's guilty verdict? So far, no
North Carolina case has clarified what happens when these prongs
conflict, but Lawrence creates this possibility.'4 6
The federal plain error rule separates these two inquiries at the
doctrinal level, but there appears to be some sense that, as applied, it
is a distinction without a difference. North Carolina has been guided
by, though not wholly deferential to, federal plain error doctrine. The
United States Supreme Court more clearly separates the probable
impact of an error from the harm to the judicial system.147 Where the
error probably affected the outcome at trial (the third federal prong),
but the evidence against the defendant was otherwise
"overwhelming," the Court has found that there was no harm to
judicial proceedings (the fourth federal prong) because the true
"miscarriage of justice" would be the reversal of the conviction. 4 8
The federal courts of appeals have not always found the
distinction so straightforward. For example, after the United States
Supreme Court issued United States v. Booker,149 holding that judicial
fact-finding was unconstitutional when the district courts were
mandated to follow the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, "thousands of
federal prisoners across the nation filed direct appeals requesting
resentencing hearings in light of Booker and the new discretionary
Guidelines scheme."'s The federal circuits have split three ways over
application of plain error review in these cases, and this split has
focused on the third and fourth prongs of the federal plain error
145. See State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 63, 732 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2012).
146. See supraPart III.B.
147. See supranotes 26-31 and accompanying text.
148. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
149. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
150. Amber K. Rutledge, Plain Error? The Supreme Court's Refusal to Resolve the
Circuit Split in Booker Pipeline Appeals and the Resulting "Geographic Crazyquilt," 55
DRAKE L. REv. 233, 241 (2006).
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rule."' Some circuits have held that the judicial harm prong is not met
unless the criminal defendant could prove that he could or would
receive a lesser sentence on remand.5 2 Others have taken the
opposite approach, presuming the invalidity of pre-Booker sentences
so that failing to remand these types of appeals for resentencing
"could adversely affect the fairness and integrity of the
proceedings."5 3 And yet other circuits have abbreviated the analysis
of the fourth prong, since if "the District Court's error was
prejudicial, the error would 'seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "154 The latter
necessarily followed from the former because " '[i]t is a miscarriage of
justice to give a person an illegal sentence that increases his
punishment, just as it is to convict an innocent person.' "155
All of these approaches are reasonable. There seems to be some
support in North Carolina case law for collapsing the prongs, as in the
third class of Booker cases. In Towe, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rested its judicial harm analysis on its probable impact
analysis. Having found the "prejudicial effect necessary to establish
that the error was a fundamental error," the Towe court concluded,
"[als a result, we are also persuaded that this error is one that
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, [and] public reputation of
judicial proceedings." 5' Similarly, in its analysis of the federal
standard, the Lawrence court implied that a miscarriage of justice
tends to follow a finding of probable impact.'"' Such seems to be the
implication of the court's statement that "[t]he standard recognized in
Atkinson is unlikely to be satisfied ...

when evidence of the

defendant's guilt is overwhelming."5 s However, a complete equation
of the prongs is not consistent with Lawrence's rule that the two
"often" concur because it would change the frequency to "always."1 59
It may be to Lawrence's credit that it did not close the door to

151. Id. at 242.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738-39 (10th Cir. 2005).
153. United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162,165 (3d Cir. 2005).
154. United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (alteration in original)
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).
155. Id. (quoting United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005)).
156. State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 63, 732 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2012) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 517-18, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012).
158. Id. at 516, 723 S.E.2d at 333 (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634
(2002)).
159. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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unusual fact patterns in the future, but this has created a gap of
ambiguity.
It would be theoretically possible for a court to find plain error
when an error did not have a probable impact on the result at trial,
but nonetheless affected the fairness, public reputation, or integrity of
judicial proceedings. One possible context for finding plain error in
such a situation could be in the case of judicial misconduct where
probable impact could be a subordinate concern. For example, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has found plain error where the judge
who presided over the trial proceedings "acted like a coprosecutor."' 6 0 The defendant was not set free but had his case
remanded for a new trial before a different judge.16' Such a use of
plain error review seems reasonable in order to protect the overall
public confidence in the judiciary, though it is less related to a
criminal defendant's actual "guilt or innocence." 62 Additionally, in
explaining the federal standard, the Lawrence court suggested that
the harm-to-the-judicial-system test could be met with proof of
"actual innocence."' 63 This is reasonable because our justice system
requires only a fair trial, not a perfect one. ' And even when the
process is spotless, mistakes happen.
Beyond judicial misconduct, however, it is less clear whether
there can be plain error without probable impact. Lawrence suggests
that probable impact is usually, if not always, required: defendants
"must" show that the error was fundamental, and this "must" be
proven by demonstrating "probable impact."6" Since the federal
standard applies to seemingly endless types of unpreserved errors, 6 6
interesting applications of the miscarriage of justice prong sometimes
arise.' 67 However, in North Carolina, plain error only applies to
evidentiary and instructional errors.168 Unlike some other types of

160. Diggs v. State, 973 A.2d 796, 799 (Md. 2009).
161. Id. at 816.
162. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 512, 723 S.E.2d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 516, S.E.2d at 333.
164. United States v. Lutwak, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
165. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. See generally WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 6 (recognizing that there "would
seem to be no error to which plain error review would not apply").
167. See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 70 (2003). The United States
Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, found plain error in appellate proceedings,
without a showing of prejudice, where a non-Article III judge sat on a court of appeals
panel. See id. at 69-70; see also WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 6, at 576 (discussing this
"unusual case").
168. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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errors,169 these two are particularly related to the verdict ultimately
rendered by the jury. Absent particularly egregious and disreputable
comments by the trial judge on a defendant's evidence, or otherwise
foolish remarks during the jury charge, it is difficult to imagine any
case involving plain error with harm to the judicial system, but with
no probable impact. At best, where the impact of the error on the
jury verdict is unclear, or could go either way, a finding of serious
harm to the reputation of judicial proceedings could tilt the analysis
in the defendant's favor. This imprecision in the law would be less
bothersome if it cut the other way. It seems that probable impact is
always required for plain error, but harm to the judicial system only
"often" coincides with plain error.
3. A Path Forward
Lawrence is imprecise. It might be one prong; it might be two; it
might be one and a half. The court of appeals is still uneasy with the
plain error rule. Since Lawrence, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has explicitly remanded cases to the court of appeals just to
apply the newly clarified plain error standard.17 0 Despite the supreme
court's persistence, however, some panels of the court of appeals have
insisted on applying Odom, rather than Lawrence, as the preeminent
statement on plain error-even six months after Lawrence.17 ' Either
some panels of the court of appeals forgot that the plain error
standard was updated in Lawrence, or some have found Lawrence
itself unhelpful in clarifying anything in Odom.
The judicial harm prong purports to be a possible limit on the
strength of the probable impact prong. The opposite may have been
more sensible, allowing reversal in the exceptional case where the
error harmed the judicial proceedings, but probable impact was
absent, inapplicable, or unclear. Thus, harm to judicial proceedings
could have served as an alternate basis for finding plain error. If the
169. See United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2005). In Padilla, a majority of
the First Circuit found no plain error under the third and fourth prongs of Johnson where
the district court erroneously delegated to a probation officer the discretion to subject
defendant to an unlimited number of drug tests. See id. at 220-23. However, the dissent
found the third, prejudice prong inapplicable to this type of error because it was not
possible to "assess the likelihood that a known outcome would have occurred even
without the error." Id. at 226 (Lipez, J., dissenting). The dissent would have found the
fourth, miscarriage of justice prong sufficient and satisfied because of the "larger,
institutional consequences of the error." Id. at 229.
170. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 366 N.C. 210, 739 S.E.2d 838 (2012) (allowing the State's
petition for discretionary review "for the limited purpose of remanding to the Court of
Appeals for the application of plain error review pursuant to State v. Lawrence").
171. See, e.g., State v. Miles,

-N.C.

App. _, _, 733 S.E.2d 572, 575 (2012).
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words of Lawrence are to be given any reasonable meaning, this
interpretation must be rejected because judicial harm is, if anything, a
limit and not an expansion on plain error review.
But perhaps Lawrence's judicial harm prong is no more than a
warning that the plain error rule is not a "roving commission for
appellate judges to seek out and correct error wherever it can be
found."' 72 It is a reminder to future courts that the burden for proving
plain error is on the defendant, and that if the "adversarial model"'
is to work, plain error reversals are warranted only in the
"exceptional case."' 74 If Lawrence is to have a future, this must surely
be it. Otherwise, the judicial harm prong is an answer in search of a
question.
CONCLUSION

The "probable impact" of Lawrence on North Carolina's plain
error jurisprudence is not clear. On the one hand, Lawrence signals a
limitation on plain error review by adding a second "prong,"
requiring probable impact and harm to the judicial system. Yet this
prong is required "often," not always, and even when it applies, its
application in the North Carolina courts has not been decided. But on
the other hand, Lawrence provided a justification and limiting
principle that would permit plain error review of trial errors beyond
evidentiary and instructional failures.'
That State v. Lawrence has more clearly explained North
Carolina's plain error rule than its predecessor, State v. Odom, is
"plain." Lawrence explains the importance of plain error review to
the entire criminal justice system, and explains the connection of
plain error with other types of error recognized in North Carolina.
Additionally, Lawrence has provided the justification for bringing
North Carolina into harmony with the rest of the nation by making
plain error review the default level of review for unpreserved errors
at trial.
But Lawrence is not without its own challenges, and the next
chapters of plain error review remain unwritten. First, although
Lawrence is clearer than Odom, Lawrence is not so extreme as to
overturn previous cases, and courts in the future may find it difficult

172. Martineau, supra note 2, at 1052.
173. State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 512, 723 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2012).
174. Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d
375, 378 (1983)).
175. See supranotes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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to appreciate how Lawrence modifies plain error review in North
Carolina. Second, the fact that Lawrence provides the justification for
expanding plain error review could lead to the North Carolina Court
of Appeals suggesting new uses for the rule. Third, Lawrence has
unnecessarily muddled the doctrine by adding a "half" element such
that an error's probable impact on the jury's verdict should "often"
be accompanied with harm to the judicial system itself. Because its
use differs from the federal standard, the state court of appeals seems
less likely to write that chapter of the plain error doctrine. If this
prong is to be given a voice of its own, it will likely be up to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina to do so.
TROY D. SHELTON"
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